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The paper discusses Article 81 of EU treaty, which focuses on the analysis of the 
competitive behavior of a joint venture participant in co-operative non-full-function 
joint venture with focus on telecommunications sector. The Article 81 analyses the 
joint ventures that fail to satisfy the threshold of the European Commission’s Merger 
Regulation (ECMR) due to the factors that either they are not fully-functional in 
nature or lack a community dimension.
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Article 81 of the European Union Treaty (Article 81) prohibits " . . . agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practises which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market…".I
Article 81 focuses on the analysis of the competitive behaviour of a Joint Venture 
participant. Joint Ventures that fail to satisfy the threshold of the European 
Commission’s Merger Regulation (ECMR) due to the factors that either they are not 
fully-functional in nature or lack a community dimension, are analysed under Article 
81.II
Co-operative Joint Ventures can be classified in to two broad categories. One, which 
is governed by merger control regulation viz. Co-operative full-function Joint 
Ventures and the other regulated under Article 81 viz. Co-operative non-full-function 
Joint Ventures. The following pages will deal with the scope of Joint Ventures (JV) 
regulated by Article 81.
Application of Article 81 to Joint Venture
The European Commission’s (Commission) notice on co-operative and concentrative 
JVs describes joint ventures as “undertakings controlled by two more other 
undertakings”III.
In other words, any arrangement between two undertakings for commercial purposes 
can be termed as Joint Venture. Joint Ventures as defined by Faull & Nikpay -
I
 http://www.eierskapstilsynet.no/rapporter/artikler/eucommergercases.doc, dt. 04-05-03
II
 Antitrust Scrutiny of Telecommunications Mergers, Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances - A Shift From 
Regulation to Enforcement By Kevin R. Sullivan, Jeffrey S. Spigel and David A. Cohen, 
http://www.kslaw.com/library/articles.asp?16, dt. 04-05-03.
III
 The EC law of competition Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay pg. 348; Oxford University Press, 1999. The chapter was 
written by F.Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, Dan Kirk, Francisco Perez and Cecile Verkleij
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“agreements by which two or more independent undertakings proceed to the partial 
integration of their business operations, which are put under joint control in order to 
achieve some commercial goal”IV. While discussing Joint Ventures, it is further 
important to analyse the antitrust consequences of these Joint Ventures. Joint 
Ventures give rise to new competitive force in the market. This may further result in 
anti-competitive spill-over effects.
“Article 81 of the EC Treaty has three elements: 
Article 81(1) prohibits certain restrictive agreements and conduct, which may affect 
trade between EC member states. A number of examples of prohibited arrangements 
are expressly identified in the text of Article 81, including price fixing, market 
sharing, and production quotas. This list is non-exhaustive and other types of anti-
competitive behaviour may be caught by the prohibition; 
Article 81(2) provides that restrictive agreements falling within the scope of the 
prohibition are automatically void; 
Article 81(3) allows the Commission  to grant individual exemptions in respect of 
agreements, which satisfy specified criteria.”V
Commission views that in the case of vertical agreements (i.e. agreements between 
firms at different levels of supply) an arrangement may be deemed to have no 
appreciable effects if the combined market share of the participants is less than 10%. 
In the case of horizontal agreements (i.e. agreements between competitors) an 
arrangement may be deemed to have no appreciable effects if the combined market 
share of the participants is less than 5%. The Commission is of the view that certain 
types of agreement, for example agreements for fixing of prices or production quotas 
or those forming part of a network of similar agreements, may be found to have 
appreciable effects even where the market shares fall below these thresholds. On the 
other hand, an agreement may be found to have no appreciable effects where these 
thresholds are exceeded, depending on the particular market structure and 
conditions.VI
IV
 See note 3
V
 http://www.legal500.com/devs/eu/cp/eucp_001.htm, dt. 04-05- 03
VI
 http://www.legal500.com/devs/eu/cp/eucp_001.htm, dt. 04-05- 03
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The GEC-Weir Sodium Circulators decision of 21st November 1977 describes the 
competitive risks associated with the formation of a Joint Venture under Article 81. In 
it’s finding Commission stated that: setting up of a Joint Venture between two 
undertakings, which prior to forming a Joint Venture were potential competitors in the 
same field of activity, is considered to be a restriction of competition due to 
replacement of two undertakings by one. The collusive effect, either in the Joint 
Venture market or related one where the parents are in competition, is also a 
restriction to competition as such. In such circumstances there will not be any 
competition within the parent and Joint Venture Company. In case the Joint Venture 
is vertically related to the parent companies, the position of the third parties will be 
affected, as Joint Venture will be preferred as a source of supply, producing a 
foreclosure effect restrictive of competitionVII.
Under Article 81, the Commission assesses, wherever the parent companies and Joint 
Venture Company are in vertical relationship, the possible foreclosure effect will be 
produced.
Role of Potential Competition
The existence of potential competition between the parent companies is determined 
by the Commission on the presumption relating to the previous activities, expertise 
and their financial resources. In the thirteenth report on the competition policy, to 
evaluate whether the formation of a JV in production field restricts potential 
competition, the Commission has set out a checklist of questions:
1. Input of the Joint Venture: Does the investment exceed the financing capacity 
and whether the parent companies have technical know-how and source of 
input products.
2. Production of the Joint Venture: This involves partner’s familiarity with the 
process technology and access to production facilities.
VII
 Refer to: note 3 pg. 353-354
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3. Sales by the Joint Venture: Would it be possible for any of the partners to 
manufacture the product on its own and whether the distribution channel is 
accessible by parent companies for the Joint Venture product.
4. Risk factor: Capacity of each partner to take financial and technical risk 
associated with the production operation. VIII
Spill-over Effects
“A JV also can lead to anti-competitive effects in markets ancillary to the JV market, 
where the JV partners may either continue to compete or may be potential 
competitors. Such concerns commonly stem from the partners' access to competitively 
sensitive information through the JV. These concerns can be addressed through 
various safeguards, thereby mitigating any potential anti-competitive spill-over 
effects.”IX
The Commission automatically applies Article 81(1) to a Joint Venture between 
competitors and to aggregate their market share in the assessment. Exxon/Shell
decision of 1994, discusses the co-ordination effect in more detail. Joint Venture 
Company ‘Cipen’, used to produce certain grade of polythene (PE) in Europe, it was 
decided that the product would be exclusively supplied to the parent companies, and 
the parent companies would in turn sell PE to the final consumers. The parents 
companies held 20 percent of EU production capacity and Joint Venture represented 
17 per cent of this combined capacity. The Commission concluded that, “the parents 
would be likely to co-ordinate their behaviour on the EU market for these grades of 
PE through the Joint Venture. Therefore the agreement fell under Article 81(1)”X.
Faull and Nikpay further commented, “It is not just the relative importance of Joint 
Venture to the parents activities on the market that will determine whether they will 
VIII
 Refer to: note 3 pg. 357.
IX
 Antitrust Scrutiny of Telecommunications Mergers, Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances - A Shift From 
Regulation to Enforcement By Kevin R. Sullivan, Jeffrey S. Spigel and David A. Cohen, 
http://www.kslaw.com/library/articles.asp?16, dt. 04-05-03.
X
 Refer to: note 3 pg. 360-361.
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co-ordinate their behaviour, the greater the parent combined market share on the 
market the stronger the incentive there is for them to co-ordinate and hence a smaller 
Joint Venture can be a source of anti-competitive co-ordination”.XI
The issues that are supposed to be addressed while assessing the applicability of 
Article 81 are (1) the restriction of actual or potential competition on parties to the 
Joint Venture (2) the effect on third parties and; (3) network effect.XII
The Commission stand, as to take an economic analysis of the incentives on the 
parents to co-ordinate their behaviour and effects, was reconfirmed in the decision of 
European Night Services.XIII The court upheld the earlier decision, stating that the 
Commission had not taken sufficient economic reasoning in its original decision that 
the agreements fell under Article 81(1).XIV
The possible link of a Joint Venture with a downstream market was dealt in Philips / 
Osram decision of 1994. The Joint Venture was to manufacture lead glass tubing for 
lamps. The case was assessed under Article 81 because the parties had 65 per cent of 
the EEA capacity for producing lead glass. Parties also produced final lamps and were 
also competitors in most segments of downstream market. The costing of lead glass 
tubing was only 0.67 per cent of the lamp.  Here the Commission concluded that 
’given the very small importance on lead glass on the manufacturing cost of lamps, 
such standardisation is not considered relevant enough as to constitute a restriction of 
competition’. XV
XI
 Refer to: note 3 pg. 361.
XII
 EC Competition Law, Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, pg.825. Oxford press 2001
XIII
 Joined cases T-373/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services Ltd (ENS), judgement of 
15 Sept 1998. Also refer to- The EC law of competition by Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay. Pg. 361; Oxford University 
Press, 1999. The chapter was written by F.Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, Dan Kirk, Francisco Perez and Cecile Verkleij.
XIV
  Refer to: note 3  pg. 361.
XV
 Refer to: note 3, pg. 361.
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Network Effects
The Commission is also concerned, when in a concentrated market a single 
technology provider may get into Joint Venture with different partners and may deter 
them from competing with each other. While discussing this kind of a network effect 
or network of joint ventures, in Optical Fibres case, the Commission found that each 
individual joint venture did not restrict competition, since parties contributed 
complimentary technologies.XVI The Commission further stated that “a network of 
Joint Ventures does not infringe Article 81(1) when provider of a technology has 
substantial interest and control over each Joint Venture and the market is 
oligopolistic. Its theory is that Corning might use the control over one Joint Venture 
to prevent its expansion in order to protect one of the others.”XVII
An express restriction of competition between the parents of a Joint Venture, resulting 
into fixing of prices or share markets would be regulated under Article 81(1). 
While giving its views on the joint sales organisations, the Commission cleared a joint 
sales organisation as not having appreciable effects in SAFCO whereby small markets 
of preserve were able to penetrate the German market whereby they met substantial 
competition.XVIII
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is of the view that, with small market share, 
organisations involved in co-operative buying and selling do not infringe Article 
81(1). In Korah’s views, a joint sales organisation cannot restrict production to raise 
price unless the parties accept restrictions on production or agree to share prices.XIX
In another case, P&O/Stena, P&O ferries and Stena lines formed a Joint Venture for 
providing channel ferry services across Short French Sea and the Belgian Straight. 
Two markets involved were passenger services and freight services. The Joint 
XVI
 EC Competition Law and Practice, Valentine Korah, pg.333. Hart Publishing, 2000
XVII
 Refer to: note 16, pg.334.
XVIII
 Refer to: note 16, pg.331.
XIX
 Refer to: note 16, pg.332.
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Venture was held under Article 81(1) because parties were actual competitors. After 
analysis it was concluded that the Joint Venture company and Eurotunnel are likely to 
compete rather than to act in parallel to raise prices.XX
In the year 1993, British Telecom (BT) and MCI Communications Corp. (MCI) 
announced a $US 4.3 billion global alliance. The venture comprised two transactions-
(1) BT would acquire a 20 percent stake in MCI for $US 4.3 billion, thereby 
making BT, MCI's largest shareholder. 
(2) BT and MCI would create a new JV - Concert, to which each company 
contributed certain businesses. 
The Concert would pursue the companies' goal of providing global 
telecommunications services to multinational customers. As part of the alliance MCI 
would market Concert services in America, while BT would market Concert in the 
rest of the world. At the time when transaction was announced, BT was the world's 
fourth largest telecommunication services provider with dominant position in local 
and long distance services in United Kingdom. MCI was the second largest long 
distance Company in the United States, and the world's fifth largest 
telecommunications carrier. The EC found the Concert "cooperative" JV to restrict 
competition because BT and MCI were potential competitors in the overall market for 
telecommunications, as well as in the value added global services segment in which 
Concert would participate.XXI In the case of BT/MCI Joint Venture, the Commission
granted exemption on the condition that users in the European Economic Area (EEA) 
may also avail services through MCI in addition to incumbent BT. This would be 
valid even during the 5-year agreement period under which both were under 
obligation to not to provide services in each others geographical territory.XXII
XX
 Refer to: EC Competition Law, Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, pg.827-829. Oxford press 2001
XXI
 Refer to note 9.
XXII
 EC Competition Law and the new economy of Information Technology, by Prof Steve Anderman, pg30. Draft 
paper, 23/10/02, University of Essex.
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In the ATLASXXIII case the Commission dealt with Joint Venture between a French 
and a German national telcom operators to provide a range of complex 
communication package.XXIV France Télécom ("FT") and Deutsche Telekom ("DT") 
proposed to purchase $US4billion of Sprint Corporation’s (Sprint) stock and form a 
global telecommunications venture, known as Global One. The venture would provide 
not only voice but also data transmission and other enhanced telecommunications 
services. As part of the transaction DT and FT would separately enter into a JV -
Atlas, for provision of telecommunications services in the EU. Atlas would then serve 
as the vehicle for FT and DT's JV with Sprint. DT and FT were the world's second 
and fourth largest telecommunications providers, respectively; as well as the two 
largest European telecommunications firms. They also at that time, were the 
monopoly telephone service providers in their respective home countries. In the U.S., 
Sprint was the third largest long distance carrier after AT&T and MCI.XXV The 
Commission granted an exemption to the Joint Venture despite the substantial 
elimination of the competition between the parents. The Commission was of the view 
that consumers would benefit from the improved technology and this would enable 
better technical harmonisation.XXVI
In another case of Eirpage, the Commission granted an exemption to a Joint Venture 
agreement between Bord Telecom Eireann (BTE) and Motorola Ireland Ltd for 
creation and operation of National paging system. It is evident from the above 
decisions and cases that the Commissions concern is only to prevent early leadership 
resulting into premature foreclosure since this would prevent competition and 
innovation of new technologies.
To grant an exemption under Article 81(3), the Commission has to show that the 
agreement does not impose on the undertaking concerned restrictions, which are not 
XXIII
 [1996] OJ L239/29, [1997] 4 CMLR 89.
XXIV
 Refer to: note 20, pg.829.
XXV
 Refer to note 9.
XXVI
  Refer to: note 24.
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indispensable to the attainment of objectives such as improvement of production or 
distribution of goods.XXVII
Application of Article 81 to Research and Development Agreements
The Commission considers that, in order to assess the applicability of Article 81(1), it 
is not only sufficient to envisage the competition between parties, but it is also 
necessary to consider whether an R&D agreement is likely to affect competition to 
such an extent that negative effects can be expected. To assess whether an R&D is 
likely to cause such a negative effect on the market, the economic context must be 
considered, taking into account the nature of the agreement and the party’s market 
power. The purpose behind the cooperation is an important factor in determining 
whether an R&D agreement per se has any anti-competitive effect. If the true object 
of an agreement is not R&D but the creation of a disguised cartel (i.e. otherwise 
prohibited price fixing), output limitation or market allocation, it shall fall under 
Article 81(1) and the same shall not be permitted. For e.g., the sharing of markets or 
customers reduces the choice available to customers and leads to higher prices or 
reduced output. Consequently, those forms of co-operation are almost always 
prohibited.XXVIII Thus dealing with Research and Development Joint Ventures, if the 
object of an agreement is to create disguised cartel, instead of R&D, it would fall 
under Article 81(1) and Article 81(1) would apply. The guideline also say that Article 
81(1) is not infringed merely because the parties have more than 25% market share 
but if the parties position of the parties on the market becomes stronger.
“R&D agreements that cannot be assessed from the outset as clearly non-restrictive 
may fall under Article 81(1) and have to be analysed by taking into consideration the 
market-related criteria such as the market position of the parties, and other structural 
factors. Different forms of cooperation in R&D may be assessed differently as regards 
their acceptability under Article 81(3). That assessment very often depends on the 
XXVII
 Refer to: note 3, pg. 357.
XXVIII
 http://firms.findlaw.com/KAYNAKLAR/affiliate5.htm, dt. 04-05-03
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stage in which the cooperation is carried out. Pure R&D agreements, as explained 
above, are most likely to be exempted.” XXIX
The Commissions policy towards potential competition is set out in Elopak / Metal 
Box – Odin Decision. Elopak and Metal Box agreed to set up a Joint Venture, Odin, to 
research develop and ultimately manufacture and distribute a new type of packaging. 
The technology was new and involved contributions from both the parents. In 
Commissions view, neither party in the short term would enter the market alone, as 
such entry would require a knowledge of other party’s technology, which otherwise 
for development requires time consuming investment. Therefore it was not regarded 
as potential competition and Joint Venture did not fall within Article 81(1). Article 
81(1) applies to agreements where parties are actual or potential competitors.XXX
Conclusion
The Joint Venture between two companies may unite their economic interests thus 
facilitating restrictive arrangements or creation of anti competitive spill-over 
effects.XXXI Joint Ventures where the parent companies are in actual competition or 
are potential competitors are regulated under Article 81(1). 
As pointed out by Professor Hawk, ‘ by applying Article 81(1) to the co-ordination of 
the competitive behaviour of the parent companies and also to the pooling of activities 
in the Joint Venture, the Commission was likely to treat the potential for efficiencies 
created by co-operated full function Joint Venture more harshly than the equivalent 
potential for efficiencies stemming from the setting up of a concentrative Joint 
Venture.XXXII
XXIX
 Refer to note 28
XXX
 Refer to: note 3, pg. 373-374.
XXXI
 Refer to: note 3, pg. 349.
XXXII
 Refer to: note 3, pg. 353.
